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Pricing and Policy Problems 
in the Northeast Fluid Milk Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This article documents the need for reform of milk pricing in the Northeast.  The 
New York price gouging law can be recast as a fair share law.  This new milk policy 
“kills two birds with one stone.”  It corrects regional inequities in raw milk pricing by 
reforming the pricing of milk at retail by limiting and redistributing excessive retail 
margins to farmers and consumers.  The fair share policy relieves allocative price 
inefficiency, improves the performance of the federal milk market order pool, and the 
general performance of the Northeast dairy farming and fluid milk industries. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
For dairy farming in any region of the U.S., and especially the Northeast, the core 
of the sustainability issue is regional differences in cost of production and prices received 
for raw milk.  Consumers are always going to drink milk and consume manufactured 
dairy products.  A critical question is where will that milk be produced?  This paper will 
not address regional cost of production differences.1  Rather it focuses on regional price 
differences, which have been ignored since the demise of the Northeast Dairy Compact in 
2001.  Moreover, the regional impacts of federal, regional, and state polices, and the 
performance of the Northeast fluid milk marketing channel are critical determinants of 
the prices that Northeast farmers receive.  I will critique the operation of federal milk 
market orders, document the demise of competition in fluid milk pricing among 
supermarket chains in the Northeast, and analyze two state level fluid channel pricing 
policies that can improve price performance.  The first is the New York price gouging 
law that primarily benefits consumers.  The second is a new and as yet untried policy, a 
fair share approach that appropriates part of retailer’s margins for payment back to 
farmers.  This second policy can be fine tuned to reduce retail milk prices as well.  It also 
reinvigorates federal milk market classified pricing which has been weakened by the 
increasing market power of supermarket chains in the Northeast. 
II.  Regional Farm Milk Price Differences 
Let’s start with the issue of farm level milk prices in different parts of the U.S.  
As part of the federal market order consolidation process that culminated with the 
establishment of eleven market orders in January of 2000, Cornell University researchers 
analyzed the location of milk production and milk processing plants for cheese, butter, 
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cultured products and fluid products throughout the United States (Pratt, et al. 1998).  
Their basic result imitates work done by milk marketing economists on pricing in milk 
sheds before the advent of federal milk market orders (e.g., Cassels, 1937).  If there were 
no federal milk marketing policies and milk were allowed to move in an “open market” 
throughout the country, farmers would have different prices for raw milk throughout the 
United States.   
This basic result comes from the fact that fluid milk, when compared to cream, 
butter, and cheese, is bulky and therefore there is an economic advantage to producing it 
close to its consumption point.  Working in 1934, Cassels explained the pricing and 
location of the production of milk for use as fluid, cream, or butter.   
 
“The cost of shipping a given quantity of milk in fluid form being greater 
than the cost of shipping its equivalent in the form of cream, it will 
naturally be shipped from points nearer to the market than those from 
which cream is shipped.  Similarly, since the cost of shipping cream is 
greater than the cost of shipping its equivalent in the form of butter (or 
some other manufactured product), it will tend to come from a zone nearer 
the market than that from which the butter comes.  Suppose that the cost 
per mile of shipping 100 pounds of milk is one cent and the cost of 
shipping its equivalent in the form of cream is 1/10 of a cent and its 
equivalent in the form of butter is 1/40 of a cent.…If the prices for the 
three commodities (in this sense) f.o.b. city were the same, then at all 
points in the surrounding territory the farmers would obtain their best 
returns from milk used in the manufacture of butter and none would be 
available for shipment as either fluid milk or cream.  In order that cream 
may be obtained, its city price must be higher than that being paid for 
butter, and in order that fluid milk may be obtained, its price must be 
higher than the price being paid for cream.  The differences in the 
transportation rates will determine the distances from the market at which 
it will become more profitable to ship cream than milk and at which it will 
become more profitable to ship butter than cream.”  (Cassels, M., pgs. 20-
21.) 
 
Note that the technical properties of different dairy products and transportation 
cost differences dictate that fluid milk will be highest priced and produced closest to the 
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consumption point.  This result is not the product of federal milk market orders.  What 
federal orders do is pool proceeds from the sale of all types of products and pay a blended 
price to farmers.  The blend price paid to a particular farm depends on its distance from a 
consumption point, e.g., Boston.  Orders insure equitable treatment for farmers, i.e., their 
mailbox price does not depend on how their milk is used (fluid, cream, cheese, butter).  
Pooling removes the opportunity for milk assemblers/processors to chisel down higher 
value product prices by threatening to switch to farmers who sell at lower prices for 
cheese or butter. 2     
In 1996 Pratt et al., in their base scenario for the U.S. dairy industry, (no market 
orders) found that milk at the farm gate would be of most value near locations such as 
Miami and Boston, and it would have lesser value in places such as central Wisconsin 
and New Mexico.  Such low value areas would be the reserve supply areas for fluid milk 
and primarily focus on the production of butter and cheese.  In this spatial competitive 
market scenario farmers located in the Northeast in fact receive a higher price at the farm 
gate than farmers in the upper Midwest.  This is because farmers in the Northeast would 
be producing more of the higher value fluid product because they are close to major 
consumption points.  Now not all of the Northeast milk in the competitive scenario would 
go to fluid.  Today approximately 60% goes to cheese, butter, and soft dairy products 
such as yogurt.  However, more milk in the Northeast than in the areas of reserve supply 
goes to fluid. 
Today, of course, we do not have open, competitive raw milk markets.  However, 
Cassels’ classic analyses and the more recent Cornell study serves as a benchmark for 
measuring the efficiency and regional equity of our public dairy policies.  The basic point 
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on regional equity is farmers in different parts of the country should receive different 
prices, i.e., farmers in the Northeast and Southeast should receive higher prices than 
farmers in areas of reserve supply, i.e., the upper Midwest and West.   
But this is not the case.  If one examines the mailbox prices received by dairy 
farmers in the Northeast and compares those to prices received in Wisconsin, for 
example, during 2002 and 2003 Wisconsin farmers received about the same or ten or 
fifteen cents per hundredweight more than Northeast dairy farmers.3  Thus during the 
2002-3 low raw milk price era when  New England farmers were suffering with milk 
prices at the farm level around $11 a hundredweight, roughly $4 below the region’s cost 
of production for a mid-sized farm (Sciabarassi, 2003), farmers in the upper Midwest 
who have a lower cost of production were getting the same or a higher price   An 
important conclusion follows:  The decline in dairy farming in New England and more 
generally the Northeast is due to price inequities as well as the commonly acknowledged 
higher production costs. 
In 2004 the situation was different.  Raw milk prices peaked at an all time high, 
but the regional imbalance continued.  For example, dairy farmers in New England 
received a mailbox price in April 2004 of roughly $17.11 a hundredweight, but 
Wisconsin dairy farmers received a mailbox price of $19.89 for a hundred pounds, $2.78 
per hundredweight more than Northeast dairy farmers.  In conclusion, cheese producing 
areas do better at both high and low stages of the pricing cycle.4 
Historically, at least since the 1960s, the upper Midwest has argued that the fluid 
milk marketing orders kept prices high in the Northeast and Southeast regions thereby 
encouraging an excess supply of milk, which depressed upper Midwest cheese markets 
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(see, for example, Cropp and Jesse, 2003).  However, over the past four years 
inefficiency and inequity in the opposite direction has occurred.5  Today, we have cheese 
market orders, not fluid milk market orders.   
Why is this the case?  Federal milk market orders, in the first instance, are not the 
cause of this change in milk pricing.  If one examines Jesse et al. one will see that 
agricultural economists in the Midwest as well as in the Northeast and elsewhere pretty 
much agree that federal milk marketing orders have been relaxed to the point that they do 
not price discriminate on a regional basis to benefit areas with higher Class 1 fluid use.  
In fact federal market orders no longer are the primary or binding factor that determine 
fluid milk prices (Novakovic, 2004a, 2004b).   
Although the Federal Milk Market Orders do enhance the orderly marketing of 
milk by monitoring processor payments and by operating the federal order pool payment 
system, the very concentrated raw milk assembly, processing, and retailing segments of 
the milk-marketing channel have replaced the federal orders as the governor of raw fluid 
milk prices.  In the current relaxed regulatory environment fluid milk prices are 
determined by over-order premiums that cooperatives negotiate and the handler 
premiums paid to independent producers.  The bargaining power of large supermarket 
chains and processors drives these premiums more than the power of milk assembly 
cooperatives.  Cooperatives in various parts of the country on certain occasions extract 
premiums on both fluid and cheese market milk.  However, today cooperative power and 
premiums are limited by the free rider problem just as they were during the 1920’s.  
Processors can make it attractive for farms to defect from a bargaining unit.   
 8
As I testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee (October 2003) in this 
relaxed regulatory environment the major determinants of the documented regional 
inefficiency and inequity in milk pricing has to be the differential power of cooperatives, 
processors, and retailers in different regions of the country (Cotterill, et al., 2003).  
Consequently, the bargaining for milk prices has taken the path that we’ve observed with 
inverted regional price differences or price differences below the cost of transportation 
between reserve supply areas such as the upper Midwest and the Northeast.  As shown 
above inverted farm level milk prices that existed at both the recent low and high points 
of the price cycle would not exist in this relaxed federal order market era if regional 
markets were competitive and all states had uniform policies towards the dairy industry. 
When cheese milk prices increase, one would think that over-order premiums for 
fluid milk would also increase thereby preserving the normal pricing relationship, i.e., 
higher prices for milk used as fluid.  Alternatively, farmers or their cooperatives would 
divert fluid milk to the cheese market until processors and retailers paid a higher price for 
fluid.  The fact that this has not happened indicates the bargaining power that retailers 
and fluid processors have in the current market channel structure.   
During 2004 and 2005, dairy farmers in the Northeast and elsewhere in the United 
States enjoyed very high prices and nearly all earned a positive return on their 
investment.  Nonetheless, regional pricing imbalances that are caused by differential 
bargaining power are extremely important for the long run evolution of the industry.  The 
documented regional imbalance in pricing, in combination with the regional differences 
in cost of production, does not auger well for New England and Northeast dairy farmers.  
As milk prices go down in 2006, Midwestern and Western farmers have more staying 
 9
power for the long haul relative to Northeast farmers because they had much larger 
profits than the fluid area farmers during the recent “cheese market bonanza”. 6   
III.  Fluid Market Channel Pricing Problems in the Northeast. 
Dairy policy has traditionally focused only on raw milk prices, and interregional 
pricing issues have primarily been addressed through the federal milk market order 
program.   Since its inception in the 1930’s the milk market order program has essentially 
assumed that fluid milk marketing channels are competitive.  Yet this is no longer the 
case, and, as explained in this section, private pricing power in the fluid channel now saps 
the ability of order classified pricing to increase the farm pay price (blend price) for milk.   
Turning now to analysis of the fluid marketing channel in New England and New 
York, one has solid evidence that retailers have and exercise substantial market power in 
the fluid milk channel.  Figure 1 provides the federal market orders monthly retail prices 
for Hartford and the corresponding announced Class 1 or Compact (during the Compact 
era) raw milk prices from January 1996 to June 2006.7  In 1996, the difference between 
retail and farm prices was approximately $1.00.  Ten years later the retail farm price 
spread is twice that, $2.00 per gallon.  The “Hartford price spread” line in Figure 1 
documents that the gap has increased over time with a very large discrete leap when farm 
prices plummeted after the demise of the Dairy Compact.8  Since farm prices have not 
increased, the processor and retailer share of the consumer’s dollar spent on milk has 
increased from roughly 40% in 1996 to 57% in 2006. 
Figure 2 breaks down retail prices into retail, processing, and farm components by 
brand and supermarket chain for March 2003.  Dairy Technomics, a firm that routinely 
estimates processing and distribution costs by brand for supermarket chain buyers, 
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provided estimates which allow us to determine delivered wholesale prices.  Note that the 
region’s dominant chain, Stop and Shop, has negotiated the lowest processing cost for 
Garelick milk and its private label milk which is provided by Garelick, 52.5 cents per 
gallon compared to Garelick’s 61.5 cents per gallon margin received from Shaws and 
A&P.9  Guida’s private label and brand milk to Big Y has an even higher margin, 65.8 
cents.   
Note also in Figure 2 that the retailers routinely capture the largest share of the 
consumer’s milk dollar.  Criner (2003) and others estimate that the supermarkets fully 
allocated cost plus a competitive rate of return for gallons of milk is between 40 and 50 
cents.  Therefore, in March 2003 when raw milk prices were in a trough the retailer’s 
excess net profit, at roughly $1.00 per gallon, equaled the price that farmers received for 
the raw milk that was bottled.  This stratospheric super competitive profit margin 
documents the market power of the supermarket chains. 10 
Figure 2 also documents a very interesting and important fact. Branded milk 
processors capture only a very small portion of the brand premium that consumer’s pay.  
Retailers, who have no involvement in developing brands, capture nearly all of the 
Garelick and Hood brand premiums.  Again, one has strong evidence of retailer market 
power. 
Table 1 reports retail prices for different types of milk in Connecticut 
supermarkets during November 2005.  For each type of milk in a supermarket the price is 
a weighted average across brands.  Note that in A&P/Waldbaums all brands of milk are 
flat priced across types.  Thus the average price for whole milk is identical to the average 
prices of 2%, 1%, and skim, and the price is $3.75 per gallon.  All of the other 
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supermarket chains except Wal-Mart effectively charge the same price for milk with 
varying butterfat content.  The Class 1 raw milk price in Table 1 indicates that raw skim 
milk is 13 cents cheaper than 1%, 28 cents cheaper than 2% and 47 cents per gallon 
cheaper than whole milk.  Flat milk pricing across milk types is yet another indicator of 
supermarket chain pricing power.  In a competitive market retail prices would tend to 
follow raw milk prices.  Only Wal-Mart pricing appears to reflect costs. 
This documented exercise of market power by retailers is destroying the 
economic basis and power of milk market orders that seek to capture the value of fluid 
milk sales to increase pooled payments to farmers.  As retailers, and possibly processors, 
with market power elevate milk prices, the demand for milk becomes more elastic.  This 
means that a given percent increase in price yields a lower increase in total revenue for 
fluid milk in the pool.  When the “yield” from the classified pricing of fluid milk 
decreases, the blend price paid farmers decreases.  If market power continues to increase 
to tight oligopoly or monopoly levels retail prices may move so high that we have elastic 
market demand.11  Then the Class 1 price discrimination scheme of the federal orders 
reduces rather than increases the blend price that farmers receive.  This is because when 
demand is elastic a price increase actually reduces fluid revenues.  At that point private 
economic power completely destroys the classified pricing system of the milk market 
orders. 
IV. Policy Options 
Turning now to policy, current traditional dairy policy does not address regional 
pricing problems.  National policies, such as the Federal Milk Income Loss Contract, and 
the cooperative CWT Program do shore up the national price; however, they do nothing 
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to redress the regional imbalance in pricing.  In fact, the Milk Income Loss Contract 
Program covers more of Wisconsin’s smaller dairy farms than our larger dairy farmers in 
New York and New England.   
If either of these programs were benchmarked to cover the higher cost of 
production in New England and applied equally across the entire country, New England 
farmers would be making money, but farmers elsewhere would be making huge amounts 
of money and would expand supply in such a fashion as to totally blow those programs 
away.  Any national policy that encourages or abets the same raw milk price for all 
farmers ignores the economic need for different price levels in different regions of the 
nation.   
One could provide relief to the Northeast if one revised the Class I differentials in 
the federal milk market orders to create a higher fluid price in the Northeast.  There is 
some talk of this in 2006 as Congress moves towards a new farm bill (Robert Gray).  This 
option, however, faces a host of opponents in Congress from other regions.  Class I 
differentials have not changed in over 25 years.  At Boston one adds $3.25/cwt to the Eau 
Claire, Wisconsin base (manufacturing milk) price.  This is only $1.55 cwt more than the 
differential added for fluid milk at Eau Claire.  Given that it currently costs around 61 
cents to move a 100 pounds of raw milk a hundred miles the federal order fluid 
differential between the Midwest and the Northeast is definitely too low to influence 
regional prices. 
What does the rise of private pricing power in the dairy marketing channel 
suggest for dairy policy?  Curiously it predicts that product differentiation (new product 
development), may take dairy farmers down the ready to eat breakfast cereal path.  Wheat 
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farmers have gained little or nothing from the proliferation of cereal brands.  Branded 
product manufacturers and retailers seek to maximize profits not sales volume.  This 
implies that the output restriction effect of market power can offset the increase in 
consumer demand due to increased variety.  The push to provide new “high value” 
differentiated dairy products and the subsidy of such by dairy farmers may very well not 
benefit farmers.  At a minimum most of the benefits will stay with processors and 
retailers.   
Antitrust enforcement that prevents further consolidation in milk processing and 
in supermarket retailing is a good idea.  But in many regions shutting this door does no 
good because the horse is already out of the barn.  Recently, in Chicago, a consumer class 
action lawsuit against the dominant supermarket chains, Jewel and Dominick’s failed 
because the price leadership scheme they use is not price fixing.  Jewel sets a high price.  
Dominick’s and others match that price.  Since no one talks (conspires) with others to set 
the price, their conduct is legal (Zimmermann 2003). 
When markets are not competitive and antitrust is ineffective, economists look to 
regulation to improve economic performance.  During the deep raw milk price trough in 
1989 and the early 1990’s New York legislators passed two related milk price regulation 
laws.  The Rogers Allen law that empowers the state to regulate raw milk prices was 
strengthened.  It briefly served as a basis for fluid milk price elevation to provide farmers 
relief from low prices; however, the implemented over-order pricing system was 
challenged and found to be in violation of the interstate commerce clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  When this farm oriented law was strengthened, a price gouging law also 
passed in a log rolling compromise for down state support.  The New York price gouging 
 14
law has continued to operate.   The law limits the retail price to no more than 200% of the 
raw milk price processors pay.   
Figure 3 reports milk prices for New York and New England.  Retail prices, on 
average, in New York are lower than in New England.  Note that the price gouging law 
tends to be most effective (binding) when raw milk prices are low.  During low raw milk 
price periods, New York prices are much lower than New England prices where there is 
no price gouging law.12 
One way forward for milk pricing reform in the Northeast is to renew a focus on 
state level policies. State level bargaining or mandated over-order premiums in the 
Northeast have been tried in the past.  As briefly explained when discussing the New 
York Rogers Allen law the approach was not successful for legal reasons.  Also from the 
economic standpoint if one assembles 95% of the Northeast farmers into a bargaining 
unit and bargains for an over-order price, processors can defeat these over-order 
premiums movement by shifting their business to the 5% that don’t participate and 
attracting others to defect from the bargaining unit.  This free rider problem exists 
because of the difference between the Class I price that a processor pays for the milk, 
which includes the over-order premium, and the blend price that all farmers receive when 
such premiums are blended back across manufacturing as well as fluid milk.  The 
processor can split the difference between the bargained fluid price and the blend price 
with someone outside the bargaining unit.  Both are better are off.  Ultimately, the 
bargaining effort collapses.   
There needs to be a new way to redistribute revenue in the milk-marketing 
channel from powerful retailers to farmers and consumers.  A policy that reduces retailer 
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market power would also help to reinvigorate the federal orders pool pricing as a vehicle 
for higher farm milk prices.  A new state level policy also needs to avoid the free rider 
problem inherent in elevating raw milk price in a particular state or region.  The new 
policy must also not violate the interstate commerce clause which prohibits states from 
impeding the flow of commerce in the nation, i.e. it must not discriminate between in 
state and out of state farmers and processors that supply the states fluid milk needs.   
Consider a fair share price policy that returns a portion of the retail margin to 
farmers.  Under a fair share approach one could set the following policy parameters.  
Retailers would be permitted to mark fluid milk up 20%, and after that half of any 
additional mark up would be shared with the farmer.  This money would be paid back 
into a pool that would include all the farmers that supply the milk to that particular 
retailer.   
Note that there is no free rider problem in this milk pricing policy.  All retailers 
pay.  They cannot avoid paying by switching to a different fluid milk processor or a 
different set of farmers that supply that processor.  Also the Connecticut Attorney 
General has ruled that a price collar approach that is similar to this fair share approach 
does not violate the interstate commerce clause.  Thus the fair share approach is a legal 
milk pricing policy that a state can implement.  This is the case because it does not 
discriminate between milk supplied by farmers and/or processors from instate and out of 
state.13   
Note that the fair share has no impact on the fluid milk processing industry.  A 
fluid milk processor continues to pay a price for milk as determined currently and 
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continues to sell to supermarkets based upon market conditions as they do now.  The only 
difference is that a retailer must share part of any markup over 20% with farmers. 
How would a fair share policy effect consumers?  The share ratio can then be 
manipulated in such a fashion that one can determine a distribution to farmers, a residual 
amount remaining to retailers, and confer a certain benefit to consumers as well.  In other 
words this milk pricing regulatory policy could benefit farmers, processors and 
consumers with a more equitable distribution of the proceeds from the milk production 
and distribution activity.  A fair share policy could be managed by a regulatory board that 
represents all parties, such as the Connecticut Milk Regulation Board.   
Consider the following example.  A state’s milk regulation board determines that 
the paid raw milk fluid price should be no lower than $17.00/cwt for 3.5% butter fat milk.  
It decides that retailers will keep the first 20% of their markup over wholesale price, that 
they will pay a certain “fair share” of markups beyond 20% to farmers, and that mark ups 
be capped at 50%.  Note that if the raw price is at or above $17.00/cwt the fair share rate 
is zero; however, the 50% markup cap persists.  The law is similar to the New York price 
gouging law.  However, when farm prices are low the fair share law returns money to 
farmers. 
Table 2 illustrates how the fair share policy could work.  From February through 
June 2006 Class I raw milk prices at Boston dropped from $18.28 to $15.65 per hundred 
weight (cwt) for 3.5% butter fat milk.  April 2003 is also in the table so that one can see 
how the policy could work at an even lower Class I price, $14.42 per cwt.  Section 2 of 
the Table gives the raw milk prices per gallon for each type of milk for each month.  The 
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price of skim milk, for example, falls from $1.17 per gallon in February 2006 to .$94 per 
gallon in the lowest priced month, April 2003. 
Section 3 of Table 2 gives the corresponding wholesale prices for each type of 
milk.  One obtains wholesale prices by adding Dairy Technomics August 2005 estimate 
for private label milk processing and distribution to raw milk prices (Durling, 2005).  
Any retailer complying with the policy and the regulatory agency would need only the 
delivered wholesale prices which are readily available.  In this example the average 
wholesale price for all types of milk ranges from $2.11 per gallon in February 2006, the 
highest price month, to $1.84 per gallon in the lowest price month.  Although this 
example ignores brand level differences, a markup rule based on delivered wholesale 
prices can accommodate them and would therefore limit retailer’s capture of processor’s 
brand equity. 
Section 4 computes the 20% retail trigger price.  Prices above this require the 
retailer to pay into the fair share fund if farm prices are below $17.00. 
Section 5 computes the retail ceiling prices at 50% markup for each month.  
Section 6 gives the actual (current) price for each month.  Note that the actual price in 
every month is above the policy ceiling price so retailers need to cut price.  Consumers’ 
savings range from 29 cents in February 2006, the highest priced month, to 23 cents per 
gallon in the lowest priced month. 
Section 7 analyzes farmer benefits.  During February and March 2006 raw milk 
prices are above $17.00/cwt, so the fair share ratio is zero.  Farmers receive no benefit.  
In April 2006 prices are below $17.00 and the program kicks in with a 17% share ratio.  
This pays 9 cents per gallon and restores the raw price to $1.46 per gallon ($17.00/cwt).  
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As the price drops in the other months in Table 2 the fair share ratio goes up to 44% and 
program payments per gallon go up to 24 cents to keep farmers at the $17.00 raw price. 
Section 8 illustrates the impact of the policy on supermarkets.  This policy 
reduces their “net of payments to farmers” price.  Their realized gross margin ranges are 
from 33% to 27%.  Their dollar gross margins range from $1.03 to $.68 per gallon.  Note 
that these realized gross margins are well above the 40-50 cents that Criner and others 
have estimated are sufficient to cover all costs including a competitive return to equity 
capital. 
This regulatory policy could require that supermarkets pay fair share monies to 
the processors who supply their milk.  Processors in turn would return monies to the 
cooperatives that supply them, most notably Dairy Marketing Services and Agri-Mark.  
The cooperatives would then devise a payout schedule, possibly a straight prorate share 
based on the volume of milk supplied by each farmer.  Note that if only one state, for 
example Connecticut, enacts this law the fair share payment would be diluted over all 
farmers that supplied milk to a plant that also supplies New York, Massachusetts and 
possibly other states.  However, if all states supplied by that plant had a fair share law 
there would be no dilution.   
What if one does not do some sort of regional milk policy along these lines?  
Would consumers, in fact, benefit from lower priced milk from the Midwest and the far 
West?  This is an excellent question, however, the answer is clearly they would not.  Yes, 
the cost of production in the Northeast is higher than those more distant areas; however, 
in Spring 2006 it cost approximately 61 cents to transport a hundredweight of raw milk a 
hundred miles.  This means that transporting fluid milk from very distant areas tends to 
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generate very expensive milk.  Also, as we have seen under the existing policies the mail 
box prices are not lower in the upper Midwest, they are higher or at best roughly equal to 
the Northeast over the dairy pricing cycle.  The disappearance of production and 
processing here would only put them in a stronger supply situation, i.e., elevate delivered 
prices in the Northeast.  Adding transportation costs to either fluid or processed products 
for shipping east also creates higher consumer prices in the Northeast.   
V.  Conclusions 
This analysis suggests that there is a need for reform of milk pricing in the 
Northeast.  The New York price gouging law needs to be recast as a fair share law.  This 
reform benefits farmers and processors as well as consumers.  It enhances the survival of 
Northeast dairy farmers and the region’s dairy processing industry.   
The fair share policy could be implemented even if there were competitive pricing 
in the retail milk-marketing channel in our region.  The cold hard fact, however, is that 
we do not have competitive retail milk pricing in New England.  . Thus the milk policy 
outlined here “kills two birds with one stone.”  It not only addresses the regional raw 
milk pricing issue where farmers need relief, it also reforms the pricing of milk at retail 
by limiting and redistributing excessive margins.  Clearly the economic viability of 
Northeast dairy farms depends importantly on state level action.  Milk pricing reform at 
the state level deserves attention.  It can improve the performance of the dairy and fluid 
milk industries. 
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Figure 1. Hartford
Market Level Retail and Farm Fluid Milk Price
January 1996 - June 2006
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
Jan
'96 Ma
y
Se
p
Jan
'97 Ma
y
Se
p
Jan
'98 Ma
y
Se
pt 
Jan
'99 Ma
y
Se
pt 
Jan
'00 Ma
y
Se
pt 
Jan
'01 Ma
y
Se
pt 
Jan
'02 Ma
y
Se
pt 
Jan
'03 Ma
y
Se
pt 
Jan
'04 Ma
y
Se
pt 
Jan
'05 Ma
y
Se
p
Jan
'06 Ma
y
Time
D
o
l
l
a
r
s
 
p
e
r
 
G
a
l
l
o
n
Hartford Retail
Hartford Compact/Class 1
Hartford Retail Farm Price Spread
Source : Data from Order One Market Administrator and Dairy Market News.
Note : Vertical lines indicate beginning (7/97) and end (9/01) of Northeast Dairy Compact.
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Figure 2. Actual Raw Milk, Estimated Wholesale, and Actual Retail Milk Pricing by Brand for the Four 
Leading Supermarket Chains in Southern New England: March 2003
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Figure 3. Weighted Average Chain Store 3.25% Whole Milk Prices
in New York and New England and Repsective 3.5% Whole Raw Milk Prices
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Policy Center.
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Table 1. Weighted Average Price of Gallon Fluid Milk in CT by Chain: November 2005 
Store Name Whole 2% 1% Skim No of Stores 
      
A & P/Waldbaums $3.75 $3.75 $3.75 $3.75 3 
Big Y $3.55 $3.50 $3.50 $3.45 8 
Shaw's/Star Market $3.69 $3.69 $3.68 $3.68 7 
Shop Rite $3.88 $3.85 $3.83 $3.80 6 
Stop & Shop $3.88 $3.87 $3.86 $3.84 15 
Wal-Mart Supercenter $3.32 $3.04 $2.87 $2.71 2 
            
Class 1 Raw Milk $1.51 $1.32 $1.17 $1.04   
Table 2.  An Example of the Fair Share Approach to Milk Price Regulation: 
Basic Rule: $0.76 markup to wholesale, 20% markup to retail trigger price, 50% markup to retail 
ceiling price, and a progressive share ratio to establish a raw fluid price floor at $17.00 per 
hundredweight. 
    
Feb 
2006 
Mar 
2006 
Apr 
2006 
May 
2006 
Jun 
2006 
Apr 
2003 
    
1. Components of Class 1 Price   
 Class 1 Skim Price 11.66 11.10 10.17 10.05 9.72 9.07
 Class 1 Butterfat Price 1.51 1.41 1.30 1.26 1.29 1.15
 Coop Premium 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.40
 Assessments 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.23
 Class 1 3.5% Price 18.28 17.39 16.12 15.87 15.65 14.42
    
2. Per Gallon Prices   
 Whole (3.25%) 1.54 1.47 1.36 1.34 1.32 1.23
 2% 1.40 1.33 1.23 1.22 1.19 1.12
 1% 1.28 1.22 1.13 1.12 1.09 1.02
 Skim 1.17 1.12 1.04 1.03 1.00 0.94
    
 Average Raw Milk Price 1.35 1.28 1.19 1.18 1.15 1.08
    
3. Processor Dollar Markup 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
    
 Wholesale Prices Per Gallon   
 Whole (3.25%) 2.30 2.23 2.12 2.10 2.08 1.99
 2% 2.16 2.09 1.99 1.98 1.95 1.88
 1% 2.04 1.98 1.89 1.88 1.85 1.78
 Skim 1.93 1.88 1.80 1.79 1.76 1.70
    
 Average Wholesale Price 2.11 2.04 1.95 1.94 1.91 1.84
    
4. Retail Trigger Price Markup 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
 Dollar Trigger Markup 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.37
    
 Trigger Prices Per Gallon   
 Whole (3.25%) 2.72 2.64 2.51 2.49 2.46 2.35
 2% 2.58 2.50 2.38 2.36 2.34 2.24
 1% 2.46 2.39 2.28 2.26 2.23 2.15
 Skim 2.35 2.29 2.19 2.18 2.14 2.07
    
 Average Trigger Price 2.53 2.45 2.34 2.32 2.29 2.20
   (continues)
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Table 2.  (continued)   
    
Feb 
2006 
Mar 
2006 
Apr 
2006 
May 
2006 
Jun 
2006 
Apr 
2003 
5. Retail Ceiling Price Markup 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
 Dollar Ceiling Markup 1.05 1.02 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.92
    
 Retail Ceiling Prices Per Gallon   
 Whole (3.25%) 3.35 3.25 3.10 3.07 3.04 2.91
 2% 3.21 3.11 2.97 2.95 2.91 2.79
 1% 3.09 3.00 2.87 2.84 2.81 2.70
 Skim 2.98 2.90 2.77 2.76 2.72 2.62
    
 Average Ceiling Price 3.16 3.07 2.93 2.90 2.87 2.76
    
6. Current Price1 3.45 3.44 3.30 2.97 2.97 2.99
    
 Consumer Savings 0.29 0.37 0.37 0.07 0.10 0.23
    
7. Farmer   
 Share Ratio 0% 0% 16% 20% 24% 44%
 Program Payment Per Gallon 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.24
 Raw Fluid Price @ 3.5%* 1.55 1.47 1.37 1.34 1.32 1.22
 Total Fluid Price Per Gallon 1.55 1.47 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46
    
 Raw Fluid Price Per Hundredweight @ 3.5% 18.03 17.14 15.87 15.62 15.40 14.19
 Program Payment Per Hundredweight 0.00 0.00 1.12 1.38 1.59 2.81
 Total Raw Fluid Price Per Hundredweight 18.03 17.14 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00
    
8. Supermarket   
 Average Price Net of Farm Payment 3.16 3.07 2.83 2.78 2.73 2.51
 Percent Gross Margin 33% 33% 31% 30% 30% 27%
  Dollar Gross Margin 1.05 1.02 0.88 0.85 0.82 0.68
* Raw Fluid Price @3.5% does not include the 0.245 Processor and Administrative Assessment 
(0.23 in April 03). 
1 Current Price from Federal Milk Order No. 1 monthly retail survey for Whole milk in Hartford, 
CT.  June 06 is May 06 price. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 See Jesse (2003).  The focus on pricing does not imply that cost of production differences are unimportant 
when addressing dairy policy issues.  Clearly they are a major force driving structural change in the 
location and size of dairy farms.  Nonetheless the price that farmers receive for their milk is also important.   
2 The classified pricing of federal orders is often seen as a government sanctioned cartel that uses price 
discrimination to extract more money from fluid milk buyers and then pool the proceeds to pay a common 
“blend” price to all farmers in the order.  As this quote from Cassels shows, this is not true if orders are 
relaxed to a “competitive” setting as they are today.  Earlier orders were tightly set to enact price 
discrimination that benefited fluid producers near large urban markets.   
3 One can find mailbox prices by going to the April issue of Dairy Market News at 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/DAIRY/mncs/. 
4 Depooling of milk occurred during the most recent cheese price run up, but it does not affect this 
interregional analysis.  Depooling in a market order such as the Northeast or upper Midwest does not affect 
the total average price received for raw milk sales.  It does, however, benefit farmers that supply cheese 
milk at the expense of farmers that supply fluid milk and remain in the pool.  For example, Robert 
Wellington, Agri-mark Economist, explained at the 2005 Litchfield County late summer picnic that Agri-
Mark depooled cheese milk and blended it over its members to raise their price 20 cents per 
hundredweight.  Agri-Mark’s action decreased the blend price 5 cents per hundredweight.  
DMS/Dairylea/St. Albans also depooled milk and depressed the orders blend price.  Independent farmers 
not in those cooperatives could not depool and thus received only the depressed blend price.  Depooling has 
even greater equity consequences in cheese milk areas of the country. 
5 Current market performance is inefficient and inequitable when compared to the competitive market 
norm.   
6  Major dairy states, such as California and Wisconsin, clearly take care of their farms.  Increasingly 
“fringe area” states such as in New England and the Southeast are moving to do so as well.  Go to the 
Maine Milk Commission website to learn of their recent price subsidy program that is tailored to benefit 
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smaller farmers most.  The states of Connecticut and Vermont appropriated 2 and 8 million dollars 
respectively in 2006 to subsidize dairy farm income.   
7 Cooperative premiums during the non-Compact era would raise the raw price slightly; however, the 
analysis of margins remain the same.   
8 The Northeast Dairy Compact was attacked as a cartel that if eliminated would result in lower prices to 
consumers.  The fluid milk processors through their trade group, the International Dairy Food Association, 
and the supermarket chains, through the Food Marketing Institute, aggressively pushed this viewpoint in 
Washington and more recently in the state houses in New England.  In fact, soon after the Dairy Compact’s 
demise raw milk prices plummeted 50 cents per gallon.  According to the IDFA economist’s model, retail 
prices should have dropped 90 cents per gallon in New England.  They dropped only 10 cents.  Private 
power not competition replaced public power. 
9 Stop and Shop closed its own milk plant in 2000 after negotiating a 20 year supply contract with Dean 
Foods (Garelick).  Stop and Shop used the plant as a bargaining chip to extort a very favorable price from 
Dean. 
10 See Cotterill (2004) for similar breakdowns for  June 2003 and October 2003. 
11 It is a theorem in economics that a profit maximizing firm always prices on the elastic portion of its firm 
or brand level demand curve.   
12 See Huff (2003) for a detailed explanation of the New York laws operation. 
13 See the opinion letter from Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut Attorney General, at www.fmpc.uconn.edu.  
Click on “milk pricing” and scroll down. 
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